The Korean economy has been significantly affected by the emergence of China. It is now the largest market for Korean exports and a major supplier of its lowcost imports but has at the same time become a serious challenger to Korea in the world markets for manufacturing exports. This paper investigates changes in China's export structure and its effect on Korea, and bilateral trade between the two. It also examines the motives for Korean investment in China and its effect on bilateral trade and cross-border production networks.
I. Introduction
Economic relations between South Korea (henceforth Korea) and China have expanded ever since the two countries established a formal diplomatic relationship in 1987. Trade between the two has grown steadily in both volume and variety, and capital flows likewise have increased although they have been mostly from Korea to China in the form of direct investment. Between 1989 and 2004, for instance, Korea's merchandise exports to China grew from US$1.3bn to US$49.8bn while China's merchandise exports to Korea grew from US$472m to US$27.8bn. During 2004 alone Korea invested US$2.0bn in China, and by the end of that year the total stock of its investment in China stood at US$8.9bn. These increases in both trade and investment are signs of growing economic interdependence between the two countries.
The emergence of China has had, as observed by Gaulier et al. (2005) , Lall and Albaladejo (2004) and Rodrik (2006) , far-reaching consequences on the East Asian economies: It has accelerated the restructuring of production in these economies and the expansion of their intra-regional trade as well as trade with edu. An earlier version of the paper was presented at a conference on Korea and the World Economy, Korea University, 7-8 July 2006. The authors wish to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. the rest of the world. Korea, one of the East Asian economies, has likewise been significantly affected, both positively and negatively, by this development in the region. China is now the largest destination of Korea's manufacturing exports and a major source of its low-cost imports. At the same time China has now become a serious challenger of Korea in the global markets for manufacturing exports. 1 In this paper we carry out a detailed examination of the changes that have taken place in economic relations between China and Korea. Specifically, we examine in Section II the changes in the export structures of the two economies, their bilateral trade, and the production networks spanning the two. In Section III we report the motives for Korean investment in China and examine the sources of procurement and sales destinations of Korean affiliates in China, in order to explore the effect of Korean investment in China on bilateral trade and economic interdependence between the two economies. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. Competition or Complementary?
How has the rapid change in China's export sector affected Korea's trade vis-à-vis China and the rest of the world? Has Korea lost its export market share to China or have its exports expanded along with the growth of China's exports? In an attempt to answer these questions we examine the changes in the export structures of China and Korea and their bilateral trade.
II.1 Changes in the export structure
To learn about the changes in the export structure we group, following the OECD classification, the exports for 1992 and 2004 into (i) low-technology; (ii) medium-low-technology; (iii) medium-high-technology; and (iv) hightechnology products. 2 We find that in 1992-2004 China, and Korea to a lesser extent, went through major changes in their export structure (Table 1) .
It is clear that China's export structure has shifted increasingly toward technologically more sophisticated products. In 1992, more than half of China's manufacturing exports were in low-technology products, such as textiles, apparel and footwear, with medium (medium-high and medium-low) and high-technology products accounting for 23.1 and 10.9 percent, respectively. By 1. Eichengreen et al. (2004) and Eichengreen and Tong (2006) argue that economic growth in China has had a positive effect on high-income countries and on countries that produce and export capital goods, components and technology, and a negative effect on low-income countries and countries that produce and export consumer goods. In this paper we show that it has had both a positive and a negative effect on the Korean economy. 2. For this purpose we regroup trade data using the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). The four technology groups thus consist of the following ISIC sectors: 15-22, 36 and 37 for the low-technology group; 23, 25-28 and 351 for the medium-low-technology group; 24 (excluding 2423), 29, 31, 34 and 35 (excluding 351 and 353) for the medium-high-technology group; and 353, 2423, 30, 32 and 33 for the high-technology group. The non-manufacturing group consists of 01-14. Between 1992 and 2004, Korea also experienced a steady increase in the export shares of both high-technology and medium-high-technology products: from 25.8 to 39.2 percent and from 20.4 to 35.2 percent, respectively. In the high-technology group the largest increase took place in radio, TV and communication equipment: from 8.5 to 15.3 percent; while in the medium-hightechnology group it was the exports of autos, the share of which more than doubled. In contrast, the shares of both low-technology and medium-lowtechnology products decreased, with the steepest decline taking place in lowtechnology products. Indeed, the export share of textile, apparel and foot-wear alone, which had been major exports up until the early 1990s, decreased from 25.4 percent in 1992 to 6.1 percent in 2004.
The change in China's export structure suggests that it has been following Korea in the 'catching-up product cycle' development that began in Japan some years ago, and Korea itself had been following Japan. With China catching up with Korea in economic development, we would expect export competition between the two to increase, with exports from the former displacing those from the latter in many of the world markets, in particular in Japan and the USA, two major markets for Korean exports. In Figure 1 we present the shares of imports from China and Korea in the world, Japan, the USA, and the European Union for 1992 and 2004. It is clear that China made significant gains in the market share in Japan and the USA at the expense of Korea, becoming its competitor in world markets. This took place mostly in labor-intensive, low-technology industries, but even in medium-low-technology industries Korea has lost some of its market share to China (Figure 2 ).
Korea has nevertheless managed to increase its share of total world exports: from 2.0 percent in1992 to 2.8 percent in 2004, by increasing its market share in high-technology and medium-high-technology products, although it was increasingly challenged by China in almost all the major markets of the world (Figure 3 ). That Korea has increased its share of total world exports, including those to China, especially by increasing its market share in high-technology and medium-high-technology products, suggests that the increase in Korean exports to China was large enough to more than offset the loss of its export market share to China in the rest of the world. 4. The export intensity of country A with respect to country B is the ratio of B's share of A's total exports to B's share of world total imports. If it is greater than 1 it suggests closer economic ties between the two. The import intensity index is similarly calculated and would have the same implication.
II.2 Expanding bilateral trade
As noted above, while Korea has been losing its market share for some of its exports in third markets to China, its exports to China have been expanding. In fact, the increase of Korean exports for the last decade was mainly due to an increase of its exports to China. As presented in Table 2 , China's share in Korean exports has increased from 2.1 percent in 1990 to 19.6 percent in 2004. This is as to be expected because rapid economic growth in China has led to a rapid increase in its trade with the rest of the world, including that with Korea. What is thus of greater interest is whether trade between the two has increased more rapidly than their respective trade with the rest of the world. To answer this question we calculate the export and import intensity indices for China and Korea, respectively, for the period 1990-2004 (Table 2) . 4 Between 1990 and 2004, Korea's export intensity with respect to China rose from 1.4 to 3.2 while its import intensity rose as well, but at a more modest pace from 1.1 to 2.0. These increases in the export and import intensities indicate that bilateral trade between Korea and China has expanded more rapidly than their respective trade with other countries in the world.
During the same period China's import intensity with respect to Korea increased from 0.7 to 3.7, indicating a growth rate of Chinese imports from Korea that is much higher than that from the rest of the world and the growing importance of Korea as a source of China's imports. China's export intensity with respect to Korea also increased rapidly from 1.0 to 1.9, again pointing to a bilateral trade that is expanding faster than their respective trade with other parts of the world. 
II.3 Growing production networks and trade in parts
The rapid increase in the export and import intensities discussed above, a measure of expanding bilateral trade between China and Korea, might be due to the geographical proximity of the two countries. Obviously, distance alone cannot account for the increase in bilateral trade, and here we examine whether expanding production networks between the two have contributed to the increase in their bilateral trade. Expanding production networks, which might be a consequence of international fragmentation of production processes, imply increasing parts trade between the two countries (Ando and Kimura, 2003; Gaulier et al., 2005) . Tables 3 and 4 report the destinations and sources of parts trade for Korea and China in 1992 and 2004 for the industries in which there is much parts trade. In 1992 China accounted for a meager 0.9 percent of Korea's total parts exports, (Table 3) . Particularly significant increases took place in computers and office products; in radio, TV and communication equipment; in precision, medical and optical instruments; and electrical machinery. These increases are a sign that China has become a major assembler of parts and components manufactured in Korea for many of its highand medium-high-technology products. This contrasts with Korea's meager share of China's parts exports, which increased only slightly from 1.3 to 5.2 percent between 1992 and 2004 (Table 4) . In 1992, Korea imported parts and components mostly from Japan (40.3 percent) and the USA (29.8 percent) while importing only a miniscule amount from China (0.4 percent). By 2004, however, the share of imports from the former decreased considerably while that from the latter increased significantly to 12.2 percent. The most dramatic increase was in computers and office products; radio, TV and communication equipment; and electrical machinery. These changes took place while the share of parts imports in those groups from Japan and the USA declined, indicating growing production networks connecting China and Korea.
During the same period, China's parts imports from Korea as a proportion of its total parts imports also increased from 1.7 to 12.3 percent, whereas its parts exports to Korea as a proportion of its total parts exports increased from 1.3 to only 5.2 percent (Table 4) . These increases are again a sign of growing interdependence between the two economies but also suggest that for China, Korea has become relatively more important as a supplier of its parts and components than as a destination of the same produced in China. In fact, while the share of parts imports of China from Korea increased, the shares of its parts imports from Japan, Hong Kong, the USA, and the European Union all decreased during the period. Except for Hong Kong, their share of parts exports from China increased, suggesting the growing importance of China as a parts supplier for the world. How Korea's foreign direct investment (FDI) in China might have contributed to this process is explored in the following section.
III. Korea's Investment in China, Bilateral Trade and Trade Patterns of Korean Affiliates
Foreign direct investment may have a positive or negative effect on bilateral trade or it might have no effect at all. There will be a positive effect if FDI is for exploiting natural resources that the home country lacks, leads to 'reverse importing' of the products manufactured by affiliates, or brings about an international fragmentation of production processes and trade in parts and components (Jones, 2001 ). As discussed above, one notable development in economic relations between Korea and China has been the growing importance of parts exports from Korea to China, China having replaced the advanced industrialized countries such as the USA as the largest destination for Korea's parts exports.
Foreign direct investment will have a negative effect on bilateral trade if it leads to a partial or full displacement of home-country exports to the host country with the goods produced locally by the affiliates. It may even have no effect at all if FDI simply creates an export platform in the host country for third markets. Even in these cases FDI will have a positive effect on bilateral trade if it leads to imports of parts and components from the home country.
It is clear from this brief discussion on the effect of FDI on bilateral trade that we can make some reasonable inference about the effect of FDI on bilateral trade from the information on investment motives. If the motive is, for example, to take advantage of low-cost labor in the host country or to exploit its natural resources, FDI is likely to have a positive effect on bilateral trade, because it would lead to reverse imports or imports of natural resources. If the motive is to exploit host-country markets FDI is likely to have a negative effect, because it would lead to the substitution of affiliate products for imports from the home country (although this effect might be offset by imports of parts and components from the home country).
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III.1 Motives for Korean investment in China
To find out the motives for Korean investment in China we examine the results of two surveys of Korea's overseas direct investment carried out in 1996 and 2003 by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET). The 1996 KIET survey (Ha and Hong, 1998) was done on a sample of 615 Korean companies (216 large firms and 399 small and medium-size enterprises (SME)) and their 952 offshore affiliates. The 2003 survey was carried out on 748 companies all in manufacturing (89 large firms and 659 SME) and their 1050 offshore affiliates (KIET and MOCIE 2004) .
In the 2003 survey the sample firms were asked to pick the most important reasons for investing overseas: natural resource or raw materials, low-cost labor, market access, high technology, and 'others'. Out of 706 firms with investment in China, 42.6 percent reported low-cost labor and 33.0 percent market access as the most important reason for investing in China. These motives are quite different from those for investing in North America and Europe, where, according to the survey, market access is the most important reason for investment. 6 According to the 2003 survey, the most important motive for overseas investment in textiles and apparel and footwear and leather industries was, not surprisingly, the low-cost labor in host countries. This is not surprising, given that these labor-intensive industries are the sectors in which Korea began losing its comparative advantage in the mid-1980s due in part to rapid increases in labor costs. FDI in such industries would lead to reverse imports to Korea and exports to third country markets from Korean affiliates in China.
Low-cost labor in China was also an important factor in Korean firms' decision to invest even in capital-intensive, heavy industries such as electronics and telecommunications equipment and fabricated metals (Table 5 ). This apparent contradiction with the theory of comparative advantage (i.e. investment in capital-intensive industries in labor-abundant China) can readily be explained, however, if the investment is only for labor-intensive parts of production as in international fragmentation of production processes. Such cross-border production sharing would have a positive effect on bilateral trade as parts and components are shipped from parent to affiliates, or the reverse.
5. Kim and Lee (2003) found that for the large firms the market access is the most important reason for investing in China, whereas for small and medium-size enterprises it is the low-cost labor. They also found that Korea's FDI in China in 1993-1997 was concentrated in the coastal areas and the areas with a high concentration of ethnic Koreans such as Jilian, Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces. 6. These survey results are consistent with the results of the Fung et al. (2002) study that shows that investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan tend to use China as a platform for manufacturing laborintensive products and export these products to the industrialized countries. The above discussion suggests that by learning about the sources of parts and components for affiliates and the sales destinations of their products we would shed some light on the linkages between FDI and bilateral trade. That is, if FDI leads to imports of parts and components by affiliates from the home country and exports of their final products back to the country, it would have a positive effect on bilateral trade.
III.2 Trade patterns of Korean affiliates in China
Here we examine the procurement and sales patterns of Korean manufacturing affiliates in China, as reported in the KIET surveys. As shown on Table 6 , between 1996 and 2003 the share of parts and components imported from Korea by its manufacturing affiliates decreased from 64.7 to 36.9 percent while the share of their local procurement increased from 26.5 to 45.6 percent, suggesting an increasing localization of parts supplies and the extension of backward linkages within China.
The decrease in the share of imports from Korea in total procurement occurred in all but food and beverage, paper and printing, basic metals, and motors and freight. The share for electronics and telecommunication equipment, in particular, decreased from 86.0 percent in 1996 to 36.3 percent in 2003. Except for machinery and equipment, the industries that experienced a decrease in the share of imports from Korea inversely experienced an increase in the share of local procurement. The increase is most noticeable in industries such as footwear and leather, petroleum and chemicals, non-metallic minerals, fabricated metals, and electronics and telecommunication equipment. It thus appears that Korean FDI in China has led to either an increase in the exports of parts and components from Korea to China or an expansion of production networks in China, either way strengthening economic interdependence between the two economies. Sales destination for the output of Korean affiliates in China varied widely from industry to industry, although for manufacturing as a whole the local sales accounted for an increasing share: from 22.6 percent in 1996 to 34.2 percent in 2003 (Table 7) . Specifically, in paper and printing, petroleum and chemical, basic metals, and motors and freight the local sales expanded significantly during the period, accounting for more than half of the affiliate output in 2003. In contrast, in textiles and apparel, footwear and leather, fabricated metals, machinery and equipment, and electronics and telecommunication equipment, more than 60 percent of output was exported, although in some of these industries the local sales increased.
Reverse imports (exports back to Korea) accounted for 17.8 percent of the entire manufacturing output in 2003, a decrease from 25.8 percent in 1996, and were especially large in footwear and leather, non-metallic minerals, and basic metals. Total manufacturing exports to third markets also decreased from 51.6 to 48.1 percent between 1996 and 2003, but in footwear and leather, machinery and equipment, and electronics and telecommunication equipment at least as much as half of the output was exported to third markets. These are industries Ha and Hong (1998) , KIET and MOCIE (2004) .
that are either labor-intensive or assemblers of imported parts and components. Because many of the parts and components were imported from Korea, exports to third markets contributed indirectly to Korea's overall export expansion. This positive effect might be short-lived, however, if the localization of parts supplies continues as it did in a number of those industries in 1996-2003.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Rapid changes in China's manufacturing sector since the Four Modernization reforms of the late 1970s have had both a positive and a negative effect on the Korean economy. China's export structure has become increasingly similar to that of Korea, turning it into Korea's major competitor and challenging it in many of the world markets for manufacturing exports. At the same time China has become a major market for Korean exports and an important source of its imports, thus expanding bilateral trade between the two. Notable is the fact that parts trade between the two, especially parts exported from Korea to China, has increased significantly. Korean FDI in China has had the effect of expanding trade and production networks between the two economies. Granted that China has taken away some of the world markets from it, Korea has gained indirectly from China's export expansion by increasing its exports of parts and components to China. Korean FDI in China has promoted the extension of this production network and thus the deepening of economic ties between the two East Asian economies.
